Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law by Denno, Deborah W. & Surujnath, Ryan
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 2 Article 1 
2019 
Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, 
and the Reprogramming of Law 
Deborah W. Denno 
Fordham University School of Law 
Ryan Surujnath 
GSO Capital Partners 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Deborah W. Denno and Ryan Surujnath, Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, 
and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 381 (2019). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss2/1 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 





RISE OF THE MACHINES:  ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND THE 
REPROGRAMMING OF LAW 
FOREWORD 
Deborah W. Denno* & Ryan Surujnath** 
INTRODUCTION 
This Foreword provides an overview of Rise of the Machines:  Artificial 
Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, a symposium hosted 
by the Fordham Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Law School’s 
Neuroscience and Law Center.  As the Symposium spotlights, artificial 
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intelligence1 (AI) and robotics2 are no longer the products of science fiction.  
AI is used by millions of people every day, from hedge fund managers to 
health-care professionals and even consumers of personalized assistants like 
Siri, Cortana, and Alexa.3  Neuroscience—“the branch of life sciences that 
studies the brain and nervous systems,”4—is integral to AI development, as 
programmers seek to improve machines by understanding human thought 
patterns.5 
 
 1. There is no uniform or generally approved definition of artificial intelligence. See 
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy:  A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
399, 404 (2017).  Mainly, the term is regarded “as a set of techniques aimed at approximating 
some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.” Id.; see also Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 
Data-Centric Technologies:  Patent and Copyright Doctrinal Disruptions, 43 NOVA L. REV. 
287, 295 (2019) (defining artificial intelligence as “a program running on a computer system 
that is able to learn and adapt itself in a dynamic environment”); Milan Markovic, Rise of the 
Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 329 (2019) (“Although definitions of artificial 
intelligence vary, the term is generally associated with the automation of intelligent behavior 
via computer processes.”).  Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig stress the importance of an 
“intelligent” agent, thereby viewing artificial intelligence “as the study of agents that receive 
percepts from the environment and perform actions.” STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:  A MODERN APPROACH, at viii (3d ed. 2010). 
 2. There is no consensus concerning how “robot” or “robotic” should be defined.  See F. 
Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”:  Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 
66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2014).  Indeed, the terms “robotic” and “artificial intelligence” 
are frequently treated synonymously. See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for 
Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2019).  That said, there is an overall view that “robots 
are mechanical objects that take the world in, process what they sense, and in turn act upon 
the world.” Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529–
30 (2015).  This “sense-think-act paradigm” differentiates robots from other technical devices.  
For example, while a laptop with a camera can “sense and process the external world” to a 
certain extent, the laptop camera “does not act upon the world.”  Id.; see also Robotics, 
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32836/robotics [https://perma.cc/ 
9VAQ-C2BU] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (Robotics refers to “the engineering, construction 
and operation of robots” to perform tasks or play a role in various commercial and consumer 
uses.); Robots and Robotic Devises—Vocabulary, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8373:ed-2:v1:en [https://perma.cc/BQ8C-WG5R] 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (defining “robotics” as the “science and practice of designing, 
manufacturing, and applying robots”). 
 3. See Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare:  Past, Present and Future, 2 
STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230 (2017) (noting that AI is used by health-care 
professionals); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence:  
What It Can–and Cannot–Do for Your Organization, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 18, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/ 
Y2WY-YQPL] (noting that AI is used by millions of people every day); Hedge Funds 
Embrace Machine Learning—Up to a Point, ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/12/09/hedge-funds-embrace-machine-
learning-up-to-a-point [https://perma.cc/7GUY-7GXE] (noting that AI is used by hedge fund 
managers); Rufin VanRullen, Perception Science in the Age of Deep Neural Networks, 
FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/ 
fpsyg.2017.00142/full [https://perma.cc/26KK-YN6W] (explaining that AI is used by 
consumers of personalized assistants like Siri, Cortana, and Alexa).  
 4. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:  BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206 (Brent 
Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762 (2014) 
(defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the nervous 
system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”). 
 5. See generally Jacob T. Schwartz, The New Connectionism:  Developing Relationships 
Between Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence, DAEDALUS, Winter 1988, at 123 (predicting, 
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During the early stages of AI, neuroscience was integral to the 
development of basic neural networks’ reinforcement learning.  Today, 
modern AI research has taken cues from neurological studies to replicate 
human cognitive functions in an AI’s code.  For example, one challenge 
facing modern AI is continual learning, which is the ability to master a new 
task without forgetting old ones.  Cutting-edge neuroimaging techniques 
allow scientists to study plasticity in the brain’s neocortex during human 
continued learning; in AI research, this development has led to the creation 
of new deep-learning neural networks that solve the catastrophic forgetting 
problem.  As a practical matter, the use of neuroscience in AI development 
seems to be leading to machines that can learn quickly and without thought 
instead of having to be “retaught” through costly and processing-intensive 
cloud computers. 
The pace of today’s research is rapid and fueled by advancements beyond 
pure software:  “neurorobotics” is a field born from the combination of 
neuroscience, robotics, and AI.6  Neurorobotics devices use biologically 
inspired neural networking systems which are implemented into physical 
platforms.  In turn, such devices are integral to the development of industrial-
grade robotics, prosthetics, and even primitive nanomachines.  Just as these 
technologies promise to reinvent industry, our traditional understanding of 
legal rules and systems could be at the precipice of major change. 
Nonetheless, AI is something of a buzzword across the legal industry.  
There is still a certain mystique to the technology’s functionality that this 
Symposium intended to clarify while also assessing how it can affect legal 
regimes.  In particular, this Symposium focused on problems posed by 
current and very near-future AI research and development with the aim to 
facilitate a dialogue among those who will shape the future of this impactful 
technology:  neuroscientists, computer scientists, attorneys, and business 
professionals.  As researchers continue to use neuroscience to make AI more 
“human” in its reasoning, the technology has encountered a range of human 
legal problems, including discrimination and bias, civil liability for risk-
taking, and ownership of data and creative content. 
Variants of the technology are also being used across many disciplines.  
Arguably, nowhere is the technology’s application more prominent than in 
the financial services sector.  AI is part of a new wave of cost-reducing 
financial technologies—all of which have the potential to change the way 
people and institutions interact with capital.  At the same time, these 
 
in 1988, a surge of growing interest by the computer science community in experimental 
neuroscience and the insights it will produce). 
 6. See Marco Iosa et al., The Three Laws of Neurorobotics:  A Review of What 
Neurorehabilitation Robots Should Do for Patients and Clinicians, 36 J. MED. BIOLOGICAL 
ENGINEERING 1, 2 (2016) (“Neurorobotics refers to the branch of science combining 
neuroscience, robotics, and artificial intelligence.  It hence refers to all robots developed for 
interacting with or for emulating the nervous systems of humans or other animals.”); see also 
Frederic Kaplan, Neurorobotics:  An Experimental Science of Embodiment, FRONTIERS 
NEUROSCIENCE (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/neuro.01. 
023.2008/full [https://perma.cc/S7T3-RNJ7] (“At the interface of neuroscience and robotics, 
neurorobotics is the science and technology of embodied autonomous neural systems.”). 
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machines threaten to multiply existing financial risks or to create entirely 
new ones. 
Regardless of the industry, ethical standards for the development of AI will 
be crucial.  There is a popular adage in the world of computing:  “garbage in, 
garbage out.”  In essence, this idea tells us that flawed inputs will yield 
flawed results.  It is an unfortunate reality that human beings are imperfect 
and susceptible to errors, biases, and prejudices.  It is thus integral to reduce 
the impact that human judgments have on the tools we use.  The transition to 
a world of algorithmic governance is not without its potential costs.  As is 
particularly salient in the national discourse, it appears that our privacy is 
something of a premium.  With the next great advancement in automated 
decision-making, individuals may stand to lose in privacy what they gain in 
convenience. 
I.  HOW NEUROSCIENCE AND ETHICS INFORM ROBOTS AND THE LAWS 
GOVERNING THEM 
AI and robotics are at the forefront of tomorrow’s algorithmic society.  
Thanks to the latest neuroimaging devices, modern neuroscience has 
revealed deep insights into human reasoning and cognition.  Some of the 
most promising developments in AI research are inspired by neuroscience.  
Deep learning and reinforcement learning, two foundational pieces of 
modern AI development, attempt to replicate neurological communication 
mathematically.  As AI is used for more complex tasks, it stands to benefit 
from even more nuanced understandings of human reasoning. 
This Symposium starts with some of the big-picture trends in modern AI 
and robotics research, especially those pertaining to the influence of 
neuroscience.  Stunningly, robots and AI algorithms have demonstrated 
cognitive reasoning capabilities to the extent that they can replicate creative 
pursuits, like art and music.  The notion of legal personhood for AI systems 
has become a less far-fetched proposition in light of advances in the 
technology that mirror (if only rudimentarily so) certain aspects of the human 
thought process.  This begs the question of what kinds of legal regimes and 
techniques will be best suited for dealing with questions of liability. 
Iria Giuffrida confronts these issues directly by examining the legal 
consequences of the construction and marketing of AI systems—especially 
when “technical advancements have outpaced legal actions”7—while also 
considering whether the problems with AI merit a revised perspective with 
respect to liability.8  For example, the surge in AI has been cultivated in part 
by developments in machine learning, which pertain to an AI system’s 
capacity to alter itself by allowing for new data9 with which it can pinpoint 
patterns for purposes of prediction.10  While AI can examine vast amounts of 
 
 7. Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI Decision-Making:  Some Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 440 (2019). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 441. 
 10. Id. 
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data, “[t]he risk of AI error is huge,”11 especially if the AI system takes in 
data that is biased and fallacious.12  Indeed, even a correctly designed starting 
program “may modify its ‘understanding’ to accept the biased or false 
information as accurate and perform its function based on that erroneous 
data.”13 
This fallible “AI Ecosystem” has created a complex combination of legal 
rules; yet, Giuffrida’s major interest concerns liability risks especially 
considering the vast array of potentially responsible parties who could get 
involved when a problem occurs.14  As she explains, “[t]here are AI 
developers; algorithm trainers; data collectors, controllers, and processors; 
manufacturers of the devices incorporating the AI software; owners of the 
software (which are not necessarily the developers)”; and of course the 
consumers and users of the products who also could be highly varied and 
layered.15 
Giuffrida’s primary concern is whether these kinds of questions warrant a 
revised solution to liability, and her potential solutions are fourfold.16  The 
first solution is to provide AI with legal personhood,17 which would mandate 
that the AI system be able to hold assets either directly (like a corporation) 
or indirectly (like a licensor or licensee of the AI system acting on the 
system’s behalf).18  In this capacity, the AI system’s liability risk would 
differ based on “the nature of the AI,” such as whether or not it is located in 
a physical object,19 as well as the AI system’s purpose.  For example, there 
are predictive systems that aid human decision-making, as well as fully 
autonomous systems that do not involve human input.20  In this context, any 
harm that the AI system causes could be a direct result of how the AI is 
programmed, thus potentially creating an intentional tort based on “negligent 
design, training, or operation (e.g., lack of adequate cyber security 
protections); or an arguably unforeseeable harm caused by an interaction 
with unforeseeable real-world data.”21  Indeed, Giuffrida provides several 
examples of how risk, causation, and responsibility could pose challenges in 
assessing AI cases.22 
Giuffrida’s second solution is to “leave AI alone,”23 which assumes that 
the major question should be “by what standard should we determine liability 
when unacceptable harm occurs but its causation cannot be determined,” 
especially in situations where there is minimal human oversight of the 
 
 11. Id. at 442. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 443. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 444. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 444–45. 
 20. Id. at 445. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 446–47. 
 23. Id. at 447. 
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system’s decisions or predictions.24  The recommendations proposed for self-
driving cars are good examples, and Giuffrida highlights an especially 
appealing one—the use of a mandatory no-fault type of insurance process in 
which a victim injured by a self-driving car is paid a certain sum without the 
need to establish how the car caused the victim’s injury.25 
The third solution may be to view “the harm as a necessary societal cost” 
and adopt “robot common sense.”26  Giuffrida provides as an example a 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Loomis,27 which upheld a 
judge’s use of COMPAS, an AI predictive device, in determining the 
defendant’s sentence.28  The court stressed that it was the judge—not the 
AI—that sentenced the defendant and that the COMPAS device was only one 
of a number of factors that the judge considered.29  Yet the concept of robot 
common sense raises an underlying principle.  While judicial sentencing is 
inherently flawed, technologically enhanced sentencing “has at least the 
possibility of improving over time and curing the current—and defective—
human system.”30 
The fourth solution is a harms-based approach, which would make the 
“compensation-deterrence methodology” harm-specific rather than 
tortfeasor-specific.  Thus, the harm created by self-driving cars may be more 
feasibly covered by a no-fault compensation system if the cars have inherent 
risks associated with them.31  That said, while this solution may be appealing 
to those companies that would prefer to internalize the costs of liability rather 
than change their products,32 critics contend that companies will instead take 
the risk and spread the predicted cost of liability to consumers.  In turn, there 
would be little financial motivation for companies to avoid harm.33  
Regulation may be an alternative to tort suits, but it also has complications.34  
Regardless of the approach, Giuffrida stresses that “we must unavoidably 
deal with a cost-benefit analysis.”35 
Giuffrida offers a new approach to these four solutions.  Instead of 
proposing a compensatory system for AI harms, she recommends focusing 
on “identifying and dissuading (and perhaps compensating) the major 
predictive harms, with the understanding that constant reevaluation will be 
necessary.”36  In addition, recent ethical codes directed toward AI systems 
could provide some guidance.  These include the 2018 adoption by the 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe 
 
 24. Id. at 448. 
 25. Id. at 448–49. 
 26. Id. at 449. 
 27. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
 28. Giuffrida, supra note 7, at 449–50. 
 29. Id. at 449. 
 30. Id. at 450. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 452. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 453. 
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of the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in 
Judicial Systems.37  In addition, the High-Level Expert Group on AI 
appointed by the European Commission published the final version of its 
Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI in mid-2019.38  Likewise, the Beijing 
Academy of Artificial Intelligence released the Beijing AI Principles, which 
were followed in July 2019 by the Governance Principles for the New 
Generation Artificial Intelligence and published by the National Governance 
Committee for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence.  As Giuffrida 
notes, the Beijing AI Principles seem to recommend that AI developers seek 
informed consent before buyers use their products, thereby suggesting the 
potential for data protection measures similar to those provided by European 
countries.39 
The United States has gone in a different direction.  While Executive Order 
13,859 of February 2019 “clearly encourages the development of American 
AI,” it fails to refer to ethics.40  The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 
demonstrates congressional concern with regulating AI and it includes an 
emphasis on bias in AI decision-making; yet it does not make itself obliged 
to particular ethical values.41  In contrast, private entities, such as Big Tech, 
are developing a framework for an ethical AI system, exemplified by 
Google’s decision to avoid a contract in which the military could use their 
AI advances.42  In a nutshell, the U.S. solution is mostly privately driven.43 
Giuffrida concludes that, while some type of AI system regulation “is 
inevitable,” the most important concerns are those related to the ethics of AI 
systems.  In addition to greater transparency and explanation, “the best 
models” will derive “from interdisciplinary efforts.”44 
Along with Giuffrida, Gerhard Wagner points out that, currently, robots 
and other autonomous systems do not have personhood and their owners are 
typically responsible for them.45  The European Parliament predicts that, at 
some point, there will be a “special legal status for robots”—seemingly as 
“electronic persons” or “ePersons”46 that would be responsible for any 
damage they caused, most likely under tort law.  Yet, Wagner questions 
whether such a reclassification “makes sense.”47  For example, personhood 
requires a range of criteria, such as consciousness, self-awareness, and 
mental and emotional capacity; yet there is no firm consensus regarding 
which of these criteria are necessary conditions for acknowledging 
 
 37. Id. at 454. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 455. 
 40. Id. at 456.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.:  Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 591, 592 (2019). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 593. 
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consciousness.48  Not only are the features of personhood “a matter of 
degree,”49 rather than “either/or,” but the primary feature “is the ability to act 
as an autonomous subject.”50  In addition, philosophical approaches to 
personhood diverge from legal ones.  Wagner notes, for example, that 
consequentialist approaches, such as utilitarianism, emphasize “whether 
autonomous systems qualify as sentient beings capable of feeling pleasure 
and pain”51 (a reigning utilitarian argument in the realm of animal rights).52  
In turn, “the criteria used by the legal system to define personhood are 
primarily biological.”53 
Wagner also questions whether robots and other autonomous devices can 
be regarded as “liability subjects,”54 a matter based primarily on “whether 
there are good reasons to treat them like as legal persons.”55  Those “good 
reasons” derive from a similar framework delineating the personhood status 
of corporations:  they will be predominantly economic56 and focused on 
whether robots “qualify as wrongdoers” and not on how much they resemble 
human beings.57  Wagner’s determination depends on an economic calculus:  
“[t]he objective is to maximize the net surplus for society, i.e., the difference 
between the gain from activities involving robots and the costs of producing 
and operating them, including the costs of precautions and the costs of 
accidents that occur in spite of cost-effective precautions.”58 
In support of his approach, Wagner specifies liability frameworks for two 
“distinct groups” of liability subjects, namely manufacturers and users, to 
gauge where robot liability could fall59 as well as the method of risk 
allocation through contract.60  According to Wagner, robot technology will 
move the control over the machines and appliances away from the users to 
the manufacturers,61 in which case manufacturers of robots will have 
substantially more power over robots than the manufacturers of mechanical 
products currently possess.62  Such control will be particularly evident where 
a closed software system is in place because only the manufacturer will be 
able to expand the device’s safety features, for example.63  In contrast, in an 
open-system approach, the assignment of responsibilities may be far more 
complex given the numbers and types of parties involved, including the first 
set of equipment manufacturers and the many suppliers of component parts, 
 
 48. Id. at 594. 
 49. Id. at 595. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 596. 
 52. Id. at 596–97. 
 53. Id. at 598. 
 54. Id. at 599. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 600. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 601. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 602. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 602–63. 
2019] FOREWORD 389 
such as owners and operators.64  Therefore, classifying the robot as an 
“ePerson” would “relieve the victim of the burden of identifying the 
responsible party and would spare courts the task of allocating liability 
between a multitude of defendants.”65 
In essence, robots and other autonomous systems will introduce new 
complications for standard tests of products liability, including the consumer 
expectations and risk utility products liability tests,66 as well as to the legal 
system’s current understanding of design defect.67  Wagner therefore 
suggests “a system-oriented concept of design defect” in which the major 
focus will be whether the system at issue “causes an unreasonable number of 
accidents overall.”68  Nonetheless, Wagner also recognizes that such an 
approach will create problems for competition in the marketplace because it 
may force a situation in which the finding of a design defect may be based 
on an “‘optimal algorithm test’ that discriminates against all but the best 
algorithm in the market.”69  In addition, the users of robots and other 
autonomous systems should operate with a restricted duty of care because 
they will possess only very limited control over the devices they manage.70 
Wagner takes time to assess the advantages and disadvantages of accepting 
robots as legal entities that have liability.71  A powerful disadvantage is that 
robots are unable to pay damage claims.72  Likewise, if robots were ePersons, 
all the actors involved in the robot’s creation would be protected from 
liability73 and injured victims would not be compensated.74  One suggestion 
to counter this scenario is to require either that robots possess “a minimum 
of assets in order to qualify as a legal entity” or that they be accompanied 
with mandatory liability insurance.75  The drawback is that these costs, if 
incurred by manufacturers, would be passed on to the users.76 
Wagner is skeptical about how much robots will be able to accommodate 
a liability system irrespective of these proposed solutions.  Even if robots 
were programmed to “learn” from past accidents and experiences and 
algorithmically adjust themselves accordingly, the capacity for this software 
improvement would still be controlled by the decisions made by software 
programmers.77  Yet, because “potential ePersons are unreceptive to 
financial incentives to avoid harm” in the way humans are, Wagner perceives 
 
 64. Id. at 603. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 605. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 606. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 607. 
 71. Id. at 593. 
 72. Id. at 609. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 610. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 611. 
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problems with respect to deterring robots’ injurious behavior “even if 
minimum asset requirements or insurance mandates apply.”78 
In essence, then, Wagner concludes that there is little to be gained by 
making robots ePersons.79  From an economic perspective, making the 
ePerson liable would result in only limited liability of its manufacturers and 
users.80  That said, if robots and autonomous systems succeed in producing 
the “great savings in accident costs that they are promised to, then no liability 
subsidy is needed” and there may be advantages to designating them 
ePersons after all.81 
II.  AI, ETHICS, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS:  THE RISKS FACED ON WALL 
STREET AND MAIN STREET 
The Symposium’s second group of articles focuses on the impact of AI on 
the financial services sector.  Big money players like asset managers and 
banks have been aggressive investors in the technology, aiming to capture 
value realized by other industries, while remaining wary of reputational and 
regulatory pitfalls.  Finance has a lengthy history with predictive technology, 
which dates back to the industry’s dalliances with algorithmic and high-
frequency trading. 
Today, financial firms also envision AI as a means to lower costs and 
improve customer relations across entire organizations.  The upsides are 
tantalizing for institutions and customers alike.  Robo-advisors, for example, 
offer automated investment advice that can provide inexperienced retail 
investors with no need for an investment manager with low-cost access to 
capital markets.  Managers, on the other hand, can devote their human 
resources to more complex accounts or strategies that demand human 
reasoning (and higher fees).  The integration of AI into finance can 
theoretically offer high margins and new profit opportunities for Wall Street.  
For consumers on Main Street, financial technology has promised lower-cost 
services and greater access to lending for groups typically underserved by 
traditional finance. 
There are risks, however, and the real-world integration of AI in this space 
can often fall far short of the ideal.  Overreliance on automated decision-
making exacerbates systemic financial risks.  Meanwhile, consumers taking 
advantage of new-age, AI-enabled services risk exposure to potentially 
predatory or discriminatory lenders.  The role of AI in finance has been both 
profitable and socially desirable yet also detrimental in many ways.82 
According to Tom C.W. Lin, there are “four inherent areas of intertwined 
risks and limitations relating to programming codes, data bias, virtual threats, 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 611–12. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 612. 
 82. Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 
531, 532 (2019). 
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and systemic risks.”83  The first risk concerns the limitations of AI code and 
the inherent unpredictability of markets.  Lin argues that AI programs are 
thus far unable to accurately model the key risks in the marketplace.84  Lin 
suggests that market risks warrant consideration beyond pure mathematics; 
communication in boardrooms or on trading floors is ultimately conducted 
by humans, complete with flawed and nuanced cues that are unable to be 
captured in code.85  Lin notes the industry’s tendency to ignore this 
proposition and place blind faith into these “infallible” machines, citing the 
2008 financial crisis as a consequence of this thinking.86 
The second risk, which deals with discriminatory data and algorithmic 
biases, raises the need to recognize the kinds of latent prejudices that exist in 
data so that they do not contribute to algorithmic distortions against certain 
individuals or groups.87  As Lin stresses, it is imperative that AI systems do 
not introduce past or present discrimination into future technology “under the 
blended gloss of innovation, neutrality, and objectivity.”88 
The third risk pertains to cybersecurity risks posed by both external and 
internal parties.89  External system breaches can range from simple acts of 
theft to state or nonstate actors attempting to disrupt the American financial 
infrastructure.  Meanwhile, preexisting internal threats posed by actors like 
disgruntled employees or corporate spies can take on greater magnitude due 
to the speed at which monetary transfers now occur.90  Because such threats 
have become more imperceptible, they are more challenging to prevent and 
defeat,91 and these problems will grow only more daunting as the financial 
industry increases its reliance on AI.92 
The fourth risk deals with the systemic perils and financial mishaps 
associated with the growing use of financial AI and technology.93  These 
risks relate to the growing size of financial institutions (which carries with it 
more risks), their increasing speed (which enables greater disruptions in the 
system before corrections can be introduced), and linkages among firms 
(which allow errors in one system to destabilize other systems as well).94  
The result, Lin warns, can be a system of institutions that possess too much 
data to fail and that operate too quickly for humans to mitigate financial 
accidents.95 
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In light of these risks, Lin investigates possible responses,96 especially 
with respect to financial cybersecurity97 and the private parties who may 
have competing interests regarding their control of the “global 
cyberinfrastructure.”98  As Lin stresses, public policymakers must start to 
provide global incentives for private firms to “cooperate better with other 
firms and public regulators” in light of the increasingly ominous threats of 
cybersecurity attacks.99  Likewise, because financial AI will heavily 
influence competition within the financial industry, firms with larger data 
sets may have competitive advantages in the marketplace that can impair 
consumer welfare and the health of the financial landscape.100  As a result, 
policymakers must be aware of such hazards and their implications.101 
Lastly, the growth of financial AI will influence individuals and society 
alike regarding the role humans will have in finance as well as what role 
finance will have in society, including shared values such as equal access and 
transparency.102  Such goals will be challenging given the clash between old 
and new politics and the diverse approaches to regulating new financial 
technology.103  Ensuring the role of human participants is imperative104 to 
maintaining “the people-centered, social purposes of finance.”105  Thus, the 
evolution of financial AI—with all of its power and potential—can also harm 
individuals.106  The key goal “is to create better financial artificial 
intelligence—one that is less artificial, more intelligent, and ultimately more 
humane, and more human.”107 
Although Lin notes the systemic risks associated with the use of AI in 
traditional finance, individuals can face more direct risks.  Kristin Johnson, 
Frank Pasquale, and Jennifer Chapman’s essay concerns the growth and 
potential dominance of financial technology (“fintech”) firms.108  Fintech 
firms incorporate the advantages garnered by learning algorithms—a type of 
AI—to decrease transaction fees and increase interest rates on deposits and 
other payments.109  Compared to the established legacy firms, which initially 
eschewed mobile banking, fintech firms can better find and service 
consumers by more accurately evaluating consumer creditworthiness and 
assessing business risks.110  In addition, by using facially neutral, objective 
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criteria, the learning algorithms mitigate creditors’ exposure to claims of 
intentional or unintentional discrimination against borrowers who are 
members of legally protected classes.111  According to the authors, however, 
in 2018 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) undermined 
this goal by allowing fintech firms to apply for special national banking 
charters, which allow them to evade important state consumer finance 
regulations, including those on payday lending and usury.112 
This essay questions the presumption that, through the use of learning 
algorithms, fintech firms help marginalized and low-income individuals by 
emphasizing two grave concerns.  First, the authors contend that AI-driven 
platforms that fintech firms rely on may mirror the biases of their 
programmers or input data, thereby fueling discrimination against members 
of legally protected classes.113  Second, the devices that machine learning 
algorithms use to identify and service marginalized and low-income 
consumers may also be used to single them out.  There are legal and ethical 
implications to either of these outcomes:  not only may the fintech firms be 
contravening equal access credit statutes, they could also further marginalize 
legally protected groups and low-income individuals who are often victims 
of predatory tactics.114 
The authors contend that, although fintech firms initially celebrated the 
advances in access to financial services brought by learning algorithms, there 
have been dangerous unintended consequences.115  For example, even 
though the facially neutral learning algorithms eliminate biases that can come 
from face-to-face decisions in financial services, there is evidence that 
incomplete or inaccurate data sets may distort the algorithms’ objectivity.  In 
addition, the quest by such algorithms to seek the most efficient path to solve 
a problem may result in targeting a purportedly neutral attribute in data sets 
that may in fact be a proxy for a legally protected trait.  Therefore, such an 
approach may produce a discriminatory outcome regardless of whether the 
program developers intended to create an algorithm that should not 
discriminate based on that very same trait.116  As the authors underscore, 
overlooking the potential for such biases “may weaponize [automated 
decision-making platforms]”117 and further hinder the effectiveness of 
accountability standards.  These dangers are especially evident in light of 
recently adopted federal banking regulations that may support such advances 
“but leave the most marginalized individuals and families deeply vulnerable 
to exploitation and discrimination as fintech firms dominate the financial 
markets.”118 
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The authors also discuss the challenge of regulatory oversight by detailing 
the origins of the OCC’s “Fintech Charter Decision”; the tensions 
accompanying it;119 its unique design;120 the federal laws, rules, regulations 
to which it is subject;121 and the authors’ concern that the Fintech Charter 
Decision “severely restricts state financial services regulators’ oversight.”122  
The authors conclude that the Fintech Charter Decision imperils state 
regulatory agencies’ oversight of predatory and unethical practices and 
hinders state regulators’ ability to fund contemporary and future consumer 
protection enforcement efforts.123 
The authors end by emphasizing the need for courts and regulators to 
weigh the advantages that fintech firms introduce with the strengths of 
historic banking platforms that provided a protective oversight role.124  They 
also recommend formal rules that would restrict or, in some cases, 
completely ban regulators’ reliance on algorithms in consumer credit 
markets.125  In addition, the authors believe that explaining the programming 
behind AI models and applications could help resolve the issue of bias126 and 
create a sense of trust between the algorithm and its user127 as well as inform 
users about the system’s flaws and how it should be properly operating.128  If 
state and federal regulators work together to produce a uniform set of 
standards, they can reduce duplicate costs and conflicts129 and provide 
enhanced oversight over potential biases and predatory targeting while also 
maintaining a balance between state and federal banking supervisors.130  In 
essence, “thoughtful collaboration among state and federal regulators” could 
help construct “the best approach to achieve early and widely endorsed 
interventions that promote the accountability, transparency, and 
explainability” of learning algorithms.131 
III.  CONSUMER PRIVACY, ETHICAL DATA PRACTICES, AND THE IMPACT OF 
AI ON DEMOCRACY 
The Symposium’s final set of articles address data protection and 
collection issues.  Modern AI relies on the collection of vast amounts of data. 
This information can provide us with conveniences and with initiatives like 
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“smart cities” offering to use AI as a means to make life easier.  At the same 
time, people’s data can be put at risk.  For example, consider AI programs 
that use patient medical information to make decisions—these offer new 
avenues of vulnerability.  There can, however, be a lack of clarity by 
regulators and lawmakers regarding how seriously AI can implicate these 
concerns.  Data regulation can exist as a patchwork that can quickly be 
rendered obsolete as technology progresses. 
Regulators and governmental agents thus partner with the private sector to 
implement promising AI-centric initiatives.  Sometimes, however, this 
relationship can result in the private sector assuming a sort of custodianship 
over traditionally “public” activities, like distributing public resources or 
protecting free speech.  This circumstance begs the question:  what are the 
implications on our society of relying so heavily on automated decision-
making? 
In their article, Ellen P. Goodman and Julia Powles examine the 2017 
creation of the first model smart city in Toronto, Canada by Google affiliate 
Sidewalk Labs in partnership with Waterfront Toronto, a public development 
agency designed to revitalize the city’s waterfront area.132  This partnership, 
as the authors note, spurred intense national and international discourse 
concerning “innovation, privatization, privacy, surveillance, control, and the 
future of cities and urban life.”133  The authors do not inherently oppose the 
technology as a means to achieve urban reform, but they are troubled by the 
dominance of a single company, Google, performing community functions 
and controlling public life on Toronto’s eastern waterfront.  The authors 
believe that requirements should have been put in place initially to allay these 
concerns, most particularly the overriding role of just one company.134 
The authors begin with the backdrop of Sidewalk’s hasty development and 
the opaque process through which the project was approved.  The authors 
explain that the Board of Waterfront Toronto was provided just a few days 
to examine the agreements that would govern its relationship with Sidewalk 
prior to being pushed to approve it.  Even though the project garnered 
substantial interest by the public and the media, especially regarding issues 
such as ownership and governance, many city officials remained unclear 
about its long-term impact.135  Regardless of how Sidewalk develops over 
the ensuing years, this first stage illustrates the perils of rushing to create a 
“smart city.”  It also demonstrates the implications of a clash between one of 
the world’s most influential companies and a small, but highly informed, 
group of citizens, journalists, and community-based associations.136 
The authors detail the starting stages of Sidewalk, ranging from Waterfront 
Toronto’s initial request for proposals in March 2017 to the revelation of the 
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“Master Innovation and Development Plan” in spring 2019, all the while 
emphasizing the extraordinary secrecy and ambiguity that enveloped the 
process.137  Ontario’s auditor general would later conclude that the parties 
involved selected “Sidewalk precipitously without adequately consulting the 
appropriate governmental entities.”138  For example, while the parties 
involved publicly released a four-page summary of the 2017 “Framework 
Agreement” between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk, they kept 
confidential the full twenty-nine-page agreement in addition to a number of 
other agreements they entered into.139  The secrecy concerning the 
Framework Agreement, though perhaps typical of the Silicon Valley private 
sector, fueled an outcry by members of the community as well as public 
officials,140 especially given both the monetary and nonfinancial costs of the 
project. 
The authors are particularly critical of Sidewalk’s proposed “digital layer” 
that would merge together different aspects of urban life within a vision of 
the “city as platform.”141  Yet, for the public, this proposal had three major 
problems:  “privatization, platformization, and domination.”142  Sidewalk’s 
“digital layer” promised robust data collection mechanisms that would, in 
turn, allow applications to autonomously deliver public services to 
citizens.143  At the same time, Sidewalk’s pervasive digital design, through 
its reliance on vast data flows and automated decision-making, would allow 
the company to control the activities that occurred over its network.144  
Because Sidewalk’s vision is inexact, it hinders the ability of citizens to 
question its construction or to suggest methods of accountability.145  
Likewise, Sidewalk’s depiction of “urban data” would make it so that “all 
places [would] become exposed and marketized.”146 
The authors make clear that their critique is neither aimed at technological 
advances nor urban innovation but rather at the enormous control of 
Alphabet-Google via Sidewalk “over nearly every aspect of the future 
district.”147  The authors recommend procedures that could alleviate some of 
their criticisms, including impact assessments for all of the project’s 
proposed services;148 nonetheless, they also give the sense that such 
recommendations may be “too late” because they could inadvertently 
endorse the “structural compromises” that have already been made.149  
Instead, all cities, including Toronto, should seek urban innovation but also 
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avoid providing such a key role to just one company.  In contrast, Sidewalk 
has introduced a “vision where its own upper hand in platform control, data 
governance, intellectual property, procurement, and access has at each turn 
an obvious and legitimate alternative:  the hand of the city itself.”150 
David W. Opderbeck discusses another realm in which AI risks clashing 
with the public interest—health care.  Specifically, AI is fueling an 
intersection between the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.151  
For example, the contributions of “big datasets and complex algorithms will 
integrate the development and delivery of small- and large-molecule drugs, 
genetic therapies, and medical devices tailored to specific user profiles and 
even to individual consumers, with dynamic, real-time updates and 
adjustments.”152  As a result, Opderbeck contends, the legal system will 
require revised regulatory models in light of the increasingly muted 
distinctions between software code, medical technology, and drugs. 
Opderbeck supports his arguments by discussing the means by which AI 
might substantially alter the present legal and economic scheme in the United 
States for drugs, biologics, and medical devices.153  The Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, through the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
“governs the sale of prescription drugs.”  The FDA is also in charge of 
“regulating biologics and medical devices”154—a vast responsibility that 
ensures that a drug is safe, effective, and properly labeled before it is 
presented to the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research in a “New 
Drug Application.”155  Opderbeck also describes the discovery, 
developments, and preclinical and clinical research that is involved with the 
introduction of a new drug.156 
More recently, scientists have begun examining “large-molecule biologic 
products” as well as genomics in contrast to more traditional small-molecule 
pharmaceutical drugs.157  Most drugs currently approved to sell on the 
market, and which are most familiar to the public, are small-molecule 
drugs.158  While large-molecule drugs face the same scrutiny and approval 
process as their small molecule counterparts, they are substantially more 
complex and more difficult to assess for use on humans.159  In contrast, there 
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is currently no approval process for genetic therapies, another class of drug 
treatment, in the United States, and they are still considered experimental.160 
Medical devices are subject to a different approval process altogether.  
They are classified according to three different levels of safety and 
effectiveness,161 and the approval process differs according to the device’s 
class.162  Opderbeck claims that AI will likely upend these regulatory 
processes163 by enhancing substantially the rate of standard biochemical and 
genetic research and decreasing the time, cost, error, and ethical challenges 
associated with human trials by relying on “in silico modeling” (i.e., 
computer simulations).164 
While some AI devices are already being applied for these purposes,165 
challenges remain before these advances can go further.166  Opderbeck is 
optimistic about how quickly AI will advance future research, ranging from 
reducing the costs of new drugs167 to helping to customize individualized 
drug treatments or implants, to producing “highly customizable genetic 
therapies applicable only to a small population, perhaps even to specific 
individuals who could afford them.”168  Yet each new advance in AI in this 
field unearths the ethical challenges concerning “accountability, equity, and 
privacy.”169 
Opderbeck also discusses in detail new procedures currently being 
developed at the FDA for AI-driven in silico trials and medical devices as 
well as investigations into how AI may affect those procedures in the ensuing 
decades.170  He observes that, although the “FDA is ahead of the game in 
creating guidance relating to AI and medical devices” and “seems to be 
behind concerning drugs, biologics, and genetic therapies,”171 medical 
devices entail fewer public health risks.  That said, he urges further regulatory 
development in privacy and security for medical devices,172 noting that the 
FDA has failed to provide guidance on privacy.173  Similarly, Opderbeck 
argues that the FDA should offer counsel regarding virtual patient models for 
in silico trials,174 while noting the potential downside of working with private 
companies175 and recommending that virtual patient models be placed into 
an open-source repository as one solution.176 
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With growing advances in AI technology, the FDA may need to develop 
new regulatory categories as well as greater privacy, accountability,177 and 
modifications in intellectual property paradigms.178  In addition, AI spurs 
topics such as concerns over global equity179 as well as discussions about AI 
in drug and medical device production at the international level.180  Toward 
these ends, Opderbeck contributes recommendations.  First, he suggests that 
the FDA should provide clear privacy guidelines relating to AI and medical 
devices and trials, with the long-term goal of adopting a comprehensive, 
cross-sector data protection regime that is specifically tailored for AI.181  In 
addition, Congress can revise regulatory models to accommodate the changes 
in intellectual property, privacy, and accountability that AI will bring.182  As 
Opderbeck concludes, by 2050, “advances in AI could herald a new era in 
which goals of distributive justice relating to global public health could be 
more fully realized” and that advancements require “a new international AI 
treaty regime that accounts for public health values.”183 
Goodman and Powell’s article on the Sidewalk Labs story and 
Opderbeck’s article on the challenges impacting the FDA both demonstrate 
the practical and regulatory hurdles facing the proliferation of AI.  As a data-
intensive system, AI necessarily implicates data protection, cybersecurity, 
and user privacy issues.  As both articles demonstrate, however, there can be 
a lack of clarity or true appreciation among regulatory governmental bodies 
about the scope of these issues.  As a consequence, private sector entities, 
whether they be Google or medical device manufacturers, can exert influence 
over the public interest.  However, the role of public interest custodianship 
can be at odds with private sector commercial interests and norms. 
This trend is also apparent when dealing with the internet and social 
networking.  The article by Madeline Byrd and Katherine J. Strandburg 
examines section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”), 
which the authors contend gives “providers and users of ‘interactive 
computer services’ sweeping exemption from liability for actionable content 
created or published by others.”184  CDA 230, while often credited as “the 
law that gave us the modern internet,”185 has spurred heated debated from 
those who claim that the Act has filled the internet with inaccurate and 
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distorted information that is biased against women and minority groups.186  
The authors focus on CDA 230 liability with respect to the increasing use of 
“smart services,” which tailor content based on models and predictive data 
on individual users.  They also use, as a case study, recent legal challenges 
to Facebook’s ad-targeting platform.187 
The authors provide support for their viewpoints by outlining CDA 230’s 
background and the relevant case law in terms of “a secondary liability 
frame.”188  They emphasize that, in 1996, Congress expected that if online 
service providers were removed from liability, the providers would offer 
technological methods to resolve the content-screening challenges.189  
Today, however, the authors contend that there is far too much user-
generated content to effectively screen for actionable defamatory, harassing, 
or offensive conduct.190  The drafters of CDA 230 greatly miscalculated the 
potential form and volume of offensive content and “would have been 
horrified by the tsunami of racist, sexist, homophobic, fraudulent, untruthful, 
and otherwise hurtful discourse that has accompanied the internet’s 
benefits.”191 
As the authors explain, under CDA 230 a defendant is protected if they are 
categorized as a publisher of information given by another content 
provider.192  Yet because CDA 230 does not define “publisher,” courts have 
experienced difficulty in interpreting the term’s meaning.193  In turn, earlier 
cases shielded “service providers against both ‘publisher’ and ‘distributor’ 
liability.”194  Such shielding has encouraged courts to interpret CDA 230 
broadly.195 
That said, CDA 230 does define an “‘information content provider’ as ‘any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.’”196  Accordingly, courts have “routinely 
treated service providers as potentially liable ‘information content providers’ 
when they or their employees independently created or developed actionable 
content” (that is, courts have denied immunity under these circumstances); 
but courts have consistently granted immunity “when plaintiffs alleged 
merely that a provider knew that a service was being used for illegal purposes 
or profited from a third party’s creation and publication of actionable 
content.”197  Between these two extremes, however, there exist intermediate 
cases in which courts will granted or denied immunity based on the degree 
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to which the service provider can be said to have “developed” the content in 
question.198  This distinction, however, is not a bright-line analysis.199 
The authors also explain Facebook’s ad-targeting platform, which uses 
automated processes to select an audience for certain advertisements based 
on users’ site activity and some offline data sources.200  This methodology 
can, according to empirical research, produce biased targeting201 and 
demographic disparities in the base audience.202  As a result, the National 
Fair Housing Alliance filed a class action lawsuit which, in March 2019, 
settled with a consent decree that “requires Facebook to limit the ways in 
which the tools . . . can be used for targeting housing, employment, or credit” 
advertisements.203  Facebook will make these changes “[o]n or before 
September 30, 2019,” using a tool called HEC Flow, which will change the 
audience selection tools in a number of ways.204 
As a way of providing a foundational background, the authors elucidate 
the principles of discriminatory advertising law under the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) and discuss the potential liability for Facebook’s audience selection 
tools.205  Assuming Facebook’s ad-targeting platform has incurred liability 
for actionable discrimination, the authors then assess Facebook’s liability for 
failure to correct under 24 C.F.R. 100.7(a)(iii)206 and contend that the 
company could be liable.207  A court could find that Facebook should be 
liable for “failure to correct” discriminatory attribute-based targeting as well 
as the disparities which resulted from its lookalike audiences tool.208  The 
authors then use a parallel type of analysis in examining CDA 230’s 
applicability to Facebook’s audience selection tools,209 emphasizing that 
courts “are thus likely to conclude that ad targeting is at least generally a 
‘publisher’ activity and to reject plaintiffs’ arguments that ‘failure to correct’ 
claims in particular are beyond the scope of CDA 230.”210 
Byrd and Strandburg also examine CDA 230 from a secondary liability 
perspective,211 noting that CDA 230 most likely does protect Facebook from 
the FHA’s effectively secondary “failure to correct” liability and 
emphasizing that “allegations of discriminatory ad targeting have nothing to 
do with content development.”  In short, “CDA 230 was simply not designed 
or intended to handle situations in which a service provider’s activities as a 
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publisher are actionable but the published content is not.”212  While courts 
have attempted to discover approaches for applying CDA 230 to smart online 
service providers, they have faced challenges because the definition of 
“information content provider” is the only relevant provision.213 
In acknowledging the limits of CDA 230,214 the authors offer 
recommendations.  First, they suggest amending CDA 230 “to clarify that a 
party is not ‘treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider’ unless liability is premised 
primarily on the actionable nature of that third-party content.”215  They also 
propose “adding a provision to CDA 230 conferring immunity on providers 
of online services capable of substantial nonactionable uses when two 
conditions are satisfied:  (1) liability is based on the design of the service; 
and (2) the service cannot reasonably be designed to avoid liability while 
retaining substantial nonactionable uses.”216  Lastly, they propose ensuring 
that “[s]econdary liability provisions based on a defendant’s contribution to, 
facilitation of, or failure to monitor actionable user behavior would be 
preempted and replaced by a contributory liability regime combining a 
‘material contribution’ requirement with a ‘knew or should have known’ 
mental state”; immunizing online service providers “from substantive 
inducement liability regimes, unless and until regulators redesigned or 
reaffirmed their applicability” to online service providers; and applying these 
rules “to both federal and state statutes and regulations.”217 
Facebook’s advertising platform is an oft-cited example of a potential 
pitfall of automated decision-making.  Yet, as Ari Waldman contends in the 
final essay of this section, widespread proliferation of AI risks undermining 
principles of accountability across many different aspects of society.  
Waldman notes that automated decision-making systems that rely on “‘big 
data’–powered algorithms” and machine learning are just as likely to commit 
error and hold biases as humans.218  As the previous authors to this issue have 
demonstrated in their discussions of Google and Facebook, the lack of 
transparency surrounding the technology magnifies these concerns.219 
Whether these features should eliminate algorithmic decision-making 
altogether as any source of authority is a reasonable question220 given that 
automating decisions about commercial and societal products may 
contravene the kinds of democratic safeguards that we cherish, most 
particularly equality and fairness.221  Yet some scholars also suggest that 
there are procedures that can curtail the biases so that that they no longer pose 
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risks.222  Similarly, Waldman believes that society should impose mandates 
that all automated decision-making entities, both governmental and private, 
should obey.223 
Waldman supports his argument by first setting out and criticizing the 
parameters of algorithmic systems and why they are both so attractive as well 
as dangerous in a society that values democracy.224  For example, while 
automated decision-making systems have powerful predictive abilities based 
on existing data,225 they can also make serious mistakes that can have real 
world impact226 as well as draw into question the fairness of such systems.227  
Likewise, the more accurate such systems become, the more complex and 
vague they appear to those trying to decipher their biases228 or take back 
control.229  These circumstances shift the decision-making power from 
humans to technology230 and potentially undermine the legitimacy of law.231  
Indeed, not only can algorithms inject racial, gender, and socioeconomic 
biases into a culture232 but the biased data sets that feed them “can entrench 
second-class citizenship for marginalized populations.”233 
By reviewing existing proposals to limit algorithmic decision-making and 
expand accountability, Waldman creates a substantive approach234 that 
includes “impact assessments, source code transparency, explanations of 
either the result or the logic behind it, and a human in the loop who can hear 
someone’s appeal.”235  While these suggestions are appealing, however, 
Waldman does not believe they can close the gaps “in the underlying social 
and political system that not only lays the groundwork for algorithmic 
decision-making but sees its proliferation, despite its biases, errors, and 
harms, as a good thing.”236  In short, the efficiency aspect of algorithmic 
decision-making can favor machines over humans237 and is therefore 
“presumptively illegitimate until it can be shown to reflect more than just 
neoliberal values of innovation and efficiency.”238 
In particular, algorithmic decision-making can embolden engineers to 
make policy decisions, therefore reinforcing their devotion to efficiency over 
any concern regarding privacy or other community values.239  In turn, the 
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tenets of neoliberalism240 show how accountability for the results of 
algorithmic decision-making can be “recast as compliance,”241 an alteration 
that not only invites corporate interests but threatens social standards.242 
Waldman believes that, in order to make algorithmic systems fulfill basic 
social values other than efficiency, regulators must independently evaluate 
the “code of automated systems for noncompliance with values like equality, 
nondiscrimination, dignity, privacy, and human rights”—an approach that 
academic researchers have been successfully following.243  In addition, each 
level of federal and state government “could enact legislation that expresses 
the values society wants algorithmic decisions to reflect” and therefore 
construct “socially conscious algorithmic decision-making systems.”244 
Because “algorithmic decision-making is a product of the neoliberal 
managerial project,”245 Waldman contends it needs strict oversight, most 
particularly by regulators and “independent academic experts” who can 
inspect the system code to ensure that it is abiding by our normative 
principles.246  Those devices that fail to pass these kinds of independent tests 
should not be released or used.247  As Waldman concludes, this type of 
strategy has two research requirements:  first, the use of sophisticated 
research to create procedures “for interrogating decision-making code” and, 
second, the application of legal policy research to best assemble a regulatory 
body that can make certain that algorithmic decision-making systems 
continue to reflect the values we cherish as a society.248 
CONCLUSION 
AI and robotics are fast-moving fields, with new developments happening 
seemingly every day.  Though no one knows exactly what the future holds 
for these technologies, we hope this Symposium marks the beginning of an 
ongoing discussion between the different professions.  The onus is on us to 
determine what we make of technology.  Will it mark the beginning of a new 
golden age for humanity or will it spiral us into a dystopian nightmare? Will 
we be Tomorrowland or The Terminator? 
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